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The exact type, critical mass, and combination of public and private assets
needed to move out of poverty have not been sufficiently studied. This paper
analyzes three types of public infrastructure and services: a) “traditional
infrastructure” such as transportation, sewer systems, water, electricity which
do not generate positive network externalities; b) «human-capital-generating
public services» that are capable of creating mobile private assets, such as
schooling and health services and c) «information and communication
technologies», such as telephone or Internet, all of which generate network
externalities. Using Peruvian LSMS data we quantify the differential impact on
poverty of each of these types of investments, as well as the interaction effect
between so- called traditional types of infrastructure and those which generate
network externalities.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Several authors have suggested that one of the fundamental causes of
poverty, lack of economic growth and income inequality is an unequal access and
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possession of assets. In this respect changes in the distribution of key assets
underlie long-term changes in income distribution and growth.1
The dispersion of spending or income, as well as the probability of
individuals and families of being poor or non-poor, depends on their stock of
assets and the rate of return in the usage of those assets. If we assume, aside from
possible interactions between assets, that the marginal rate of return of any physical,
human, financial, public or organizational capital does not depend on asset base,
the distribution of assets plays the most critical role in the determination of the
distribution of income and spending.
Despite the fact that access to public and private assets continues to be
restricted and unevenly distributed in rural Peru, changes in the level and in the
pattern of ownership of these assets during the last 15 years have been quite
dramatic. For example, in 1985 the level of schooling of heads of household was
very low and unequal in the rural sector. In 1997, average years of education had
increased from 2.9 to 5, and inequality has declined: the schooling years among
the poorest sectors has almost doubled while among the richest it has increased
about 50%. The average family size in the poorest quintile was 50% higher than the
average in the richest quintile. On the other hand, access to credit was relatively
segmented, being very low in the poorest quintile.  The 1997 Peruvian LSMS
survey revealed that although global access to credit had fallen from 23% of
farmers to 16%, it had increased for the poorest quintile and fallen for the other
quintiles, particularly the richest. In the case of access to basic services
infrastructure (electricity, telephone services and water and sewerage), levels of
access were low and highly inequitable in 1985. In contrast in 1997, at least in the
case of water and electricity, access had doubled: 27% and 24% of households had
access to these services, respectively. However dispersion in access by spending
decile turned now to be much more pronounced than 15 years ago. This is so
because the pattern of invest in public infrastructure had been biased against the
poorest segments in rural Peru leaving them in a poverty trap.
Putting these changes in asset ownership in perspective, the purpose of
this paper is to evaluate, using household and communal level surveys, the
differential impact on poverty of different types of asset investments. We consider
three types of public goods and services: a) “traditional infrastructure” such as
transportation, sewer systems, water, electricity which do not generate positive
network externalities; b) “human-capital-generating public services” that are capable
of creating mobile private assets, such as schooling and health services and c)
“information and communication technologies”, such as telephone or Internet, all
of which generate network externalities.
We also look at the interaction effects on poverty between the so-called
traditional infrastructure and those that generate network externalities. In addition,
given the indivisible and irreversible nature of most of these investments, we
intend to evaluate the critical mass of investments of each type required to create
1See for example Birdsall and Londoño (1998) or Bebbington(1999).MEASURING THE IMPACT OF ASSET COMPLEMENTARITIES 139
the externalities and positive spillovers over private assets for effective poverty
reduction strategies.
The paper is divided in 5 sections including this introduction. In section
two a brief overview of poverty and income inequality trends in Peru is presented
as well as an initial assessment of the relationship between asset inequality and
poverty outcomes. In section three we analyze the importance of geographic
constraints that characterize rural Peru, showing how important are these
constraints as irreversible initial conditions explaining a possible poverty trap. We
analyze to what extent these initial adverse conditions can be explained when one
takes into account the spatial concentration of households with readily observa-
ble non-geographic characteristics, in particular public and private assets. This
does not mean, however that geography is not important but that its influence on
expenditure level and growth differential comes about through a spatially uneven
provision of public infrastructure.
In section four we concentrate our analysis in evaluating, using household
and communal level surveys, the differential impact on poverty of each of the
types of assets mentioned above (human capital, traditional infrastructure and
information and communication technologies), as well as the way they interact. In
addition, we carry out a initial set of simulations as a first evaluation of the
importance of a critical mass of investments of each type required to create the
externalities and positive spillovers over private assets for effective poverty
reduction strategies. Finally, section five summarizes our findings.
2. POVERTY AND ASSET INEQUALITY IN PERU
Poverty in Peru has changed dramatically over the last three decades (see
Table 1), experiencing not only an important reduction but also compositional
changes. While in the early 1970s poverty was largely rural —two-thirds of the
poor were rural dwellers employed in agriculture— the picture reversed in the mid-
1990s, at which point two-thirds of the poor were reported to be urban dwellers.
Hence, while urban poverty rates have risen ten points over the last 28 years, in
the rural sector poverty has fallen 18 points.  In this sense, it is possible that the
entire long-term reduction in poverty could be a rural phenomenon arising out of
a major migratory process.2
2The 1991 survey does not include tropical forest areas and the rural coast, while the other
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TABLE 1
POVERTY INDICATORS BY REGION: 1971, 1985, 1991, 1994 AND 1996
(By family spending - percentages)
Authors' own figures based on ENCA (1971-72) and ENNIV 1985-86, 1991, 1994, 1997 and
2000.
Although Peru continues to be a country with high poverty rates and, by
international standards highly unequal income distribution, when we look at the
long term trends in income distribution the Gini figures show a downward trend.
Since the 1970s a clear pattern of reduction in dispersion has been observed. As
shown in Graph 1 the Gini coefficient of family income fell from 0.55 to 0.40 between
the early 1970s and the 1990s. The percentage of total income received by the
poorest half of the population rose from 10.7% to 24.5% in 1996, while the share of
richest half fell from 61% to 43%. This trend in income distribution from the 1970s
can also be corroborated by the estimate of indicators of concentration based on
family spending.3
The connection between asset endowments and poverty alleviation is well
understood in the economic literature. For example, Birdsall and Londoño (1998)
suggest that one of the fundamental causes of poverty and income inequality is
unequal access to and possession of assets. In this respect, it should be possible
to find changes in the distribution of key assets that underlie these long-term
changes in income distribution.
The dispersion of spending or income, as well as the probabilities of
individuals and families being poor or non-poor, depends on their asset ownership
and their rate of return which, in turn, are critically determined by the ownership or
access to key complementary assets. Table 2 shows the average level of possession
or access to different key assets in Peruvian urban and rural sectors. Obviously
assets are not totally exogenous variables. The possession of assets depends on
the possession of other assets, on changes in acquisition prices and in the expected
return on the assets. However, compared to previous years (see Escobal et al.
1998), patterns of possession and access to assets by position on the scale of
spending were relatively similar, although the average in some cases had changed.
For example, access to electricity has increased substantially, with the exception of
the poorest quintile. Access to telephones, average level of education, average
years’ experience and the age of the head of household also rose, although the
distribution did not varied substantially.
3These results are shown in Escobal, Saavedra and Torero (1998).
Region 1971-72 1985 1991 1994 1997 2000
Peru 64.0 43.1 59.0 53.4 50.7 54.1
Urban 39.6 36.0 53.3 50.4 48.9 49.8
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GRAPH 1
INCOME DISTRIBUTION IN PERU
To capture the level and the changes in the disparities in the ownership of
assets, Gini coefficients were calculated for some of the assets for urban and rural
areas (see Graph 2). The assets with the highest degree of dispersion in urban
areas are possession of durable goods and the labor experience of the head of
household. The education variables reveal relatively low dispersion, a fact that is
consistent with rapid expansion of the educational system, which began in the
1970s. On the other hand when we look to the rural areas the highest inequality can
be found on value of land (basically due to differences in quality), on the value of
durable goods and on the proportion of members with migration experience. In
rural areas education inequality has also been reduced substantially as a
consequence of the expansion of the educational system. It is important to note
that if these calculations were done at national level, the inequality of many of
these assets would be much greater because of the large gap in access to education













































*For Urban Peru de distance is to the nerest market.
Urban Peru Rural Peru
Average Quintiles Average Quintiles
I II III IV V I II III IV V
Human capital assets
Average education attained by family 9.42 7.72 8.90 9.87 10.28 10.33 5.97 5.09 5.65 6.15 6.07 6.91
Average education of the household head 9.36 7.29 8.38 9.26 10.29 11.60 60.7 5.11 5.64 6.16 6.35 7.08
Access to primary school N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A N.A 0.81 0.85 0.83 0.79 0.81 0.78
Access to secondary school N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A N.A 0.24 0.25 0.22 0.23 0.30 0.21
Communal association N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A N.A 0.70 0.74 0.72 0.74 0.72 0.59
Access to health services N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A N.A 0.29 0.29 0.26 0.28 0.36 0.27
Traditional infrastructure
Drinkable water 0.89 0.79 0.85 0.91 0.92 0.96 0.35 0.20 0.33 0.37 0.40 0.46
Sewerage 0.84 0.67 0.79 0.86 0.91 0.97 0.10 0.08 0.08 0.11 0.07 0.18
Electricity 0.95 0.84 0.96 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.34 0.24 0.24 0.32 0.40 0.51
Distance to roads* 5.83 7.60 3.69 7.23 8.98 1.64 2.45 3.29 2.75 2.57 2.10 1.54
Information and communication technologies
Telephone 0.36 0.07 0.18 0.34 0.49 0.74 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03
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GRAPH 2
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3. GEOGRAPHIC RESTRICTIONS
Current literature had argued (Jalan and Ravallion,1998; Engerman and
Sokoloff, 1998) that geography has a causal role in determining how household
welfare evolves over time. By this view, geographic externalities arising from natu-
ral geographic characteristics could be the main reason explaining why poor
households cannot escape out of poverty. Instead, our hypothesis is that what
seem to be sizable geographic differences in living standards in Peru can be almost
fully explained when one takes into account the spatial concentration of households
with readily observable non-geographic characteristics, in particular public and
private assets. In other words, the same observationally equivalent household
has a similar expenditure level in one place as in another with different geographic
characteristics such as altitude or temperature. This does not mean however that
geography is not important, but that its influence on expenditure level and growth
differential comes about through a spatially uneven provision of public
infrastructure. If this is so, then it is important for policy to understand the
importance of an adequate provision of public and private assets.
Specifically in the case of Peru, the geography question is of great
importance. The Peruvian astonishing variety of ecological areas, including 84
different climate zones and landscapes with rainforests, high mountain ranges and
dry deserts, could play a large role in explaining regional variations in income and
welfare. Therefore, we are interested in testing if geography plays or not a causal
role in determining the evolution of household welfare over time (Escobal and
Torero, 2000).
Following Escobal and Torero (2000) and Ravallion and Wodon (1997) we
break down the geographic effects into their component elements, taking into
account observed differences in asset endowments and rate of return of asset
ownership across regions. For this purpose, we compute the expected gain (or
loss) in consumption from living in one geographic region (coast for example)
against living in another adverse geographic region (i.e. mountains) specifying
how much of the gain is explained by geographical variables and location (urban
or rural areas) and how much by the presence of all the types of infrastructure and
private assets:
(1) MC ˆ (XX) b -
where  M,C X are the sample means for mountain and coast regions for example,
and ˆ b  is the parameter of the respective variables under analysis (i.e. geographical,
location, infrastructure and private assets).4 This break-down represents the
differential impact on a household’s standard of all non-excluded variables in the
two regions.
4The parameter can be obtained estimating expenditure as a function of geographic
characteristics, private assets, and the different types of public assets.MEASURING THE IMPACT OF ASSET COMPLEMENTARITIES 145
For this break-down we have assumed that parameters are stable within the
three main geographic regions: coast, highland and jungle. This initial break-down
is shown in Table 3. In the first column we see that most of the difference in log per
capita expenditure between the highland and the coast can be accounted for by
the differences in infrastructure endowments and private assets. In other words,
once the main geographic variables are accounted for (altitude, temperature and
surface characteristics), only private assets and infrastructure endowments are
needed to explain regional expenditure differences. Similarly, the second column
shows the break-down of the differences in log per capita expenditure between the
jungle area and the coast, showing again that once main geographic variables are
accounted for most of the regional expenditure differences can be explained by
infrastructure endowment and private asset composition.
Obviously, the fact that geography has no additional impact on regional
per-capita expenditure differences has to do with the fact that key infrastructure
variables such as school and medical facilities, access to electricity, water and
sanitation, as well as private assets, have dampened the effect of geography on
regional expenditure differentials. To see this, Table 4 performs the same break-
down exercise introducing each set of variables sequentially. First geography
variables are entered in the model alone and the break-down exercise is conducted
only with these variables. In this case, geography is highly significant in explaining
per-capita expenditure differentials between the highland and coastal areas, as
well as between the jungle and coastal areas of Peru. Geography remains highly
significant even after we introduce location variables and their cross–products
into the analysis. However, once infrastructure variables come into play in the
analysis, the impact of geography disappears, as the coefficients associated with
these types of variables are shown to be jointly non–significant. This could be
because, in the models without infrastructure, the geography variables were
choosing their effect and therefore when improving our specification the effect of
these variables disappears.
These results suggest that a poverty trap linked to adverse geographic
conditions may be overcome with an adequate provision of private and public
assets. However, the exact type, critical mass, and combination of public and
private assets needed to overcome these poverty traps remain largely unstudied
in Peru, along with presenting a knowledge gap in the international literature on
poverty. To try to contribute towards filling that gap, in the next section we evaluate,
using household- and community- level surveys, the differential impact on poverty
of each of these types of investments, as well as the interaction effect between the
so-called traditional forms of infrastructure and those that generate network
externalities.146 CUADERNOS DE ECONOMÍA Vol. 42 (Mayo) 2005
TABLE 3
DECOMPOSITION OF REGIONAL PER CAPITA EXPENDITURE DIFFERENCES
(Log differences)
Note: Parameters are significant at the * = 0.01 level and  ** at the 0.5 level.
Source:  Author’s calculation based on 1994 LSMS.
Group of variables Highland-coast Jungle-coast
Geography -0.163 0.031
Altitude -0.036 -0.004
Temperature -0.235 * 0.173 *
Temperature squared 0.117 -0.121
Igneous rocks 0.015 ** -0.004 **
Sediments rocks -0.004 -0-009
Land depth -0.022 -0.005
Location 0.050 0.039
Urbanization 0.055 0.038
Distance to province capital -0.005 0.001
Geography * location 0.081 ** 0.007 **
Urbanization*altitude 0.081 ** 0.007 **
Infrastructure -0.024 ** -0.064 **
Perinhabitant schools in town 0.024 0.023
Perinhabitant medical centers in town 0.010 0.009
Basic needs -0.058 * -0.095 *
Private assets -0.185 * -0.258 *
Household size -0.031 * -0.064 *
Schooling years (household head) -0.061 * -0.065 *
Schooling years (other members) -0.069 * -0.012 *
Potential labor experience -0.013 * -0.024 *
Household head gender 0.000 -0.001
Number of migrantes -0.009 ** -0.005 **
Spell of illness (household head) 0.000 0.000
Savings 0.002 * 0.000 *
Value of durable goods -0.003 0.004
Explained -0.241 -0.244
Residual 0.024 0.077
Total -0.217 -0.167MEASURING THE IMPACT OF ASSET COMPLEMENTARITIES 147
TABLE 4
DECOMPOSITION OF REGIONAL PER CAPITA EXPENDITURE
DIFFERENCES, BY MODEL
Note: Parameters are significant at the * = 0.01 level,  ** at the 0.5 lvel and *** at the 0.1
level.
Source:  Author’s calculation based on 1994 LSMS.
4. MEASURING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ASSETS AND POVERTY
4.1. Conceptual Framework
Depending on the conceptual framework, the relationship between
possession of or access to certain assets and the condition of poverty can be
viewed either as a profile of poverty or an attempt to understand its determinants.
Based on a static optimization model of household production and consumption,
it is possible to derive a relationship between household spending and asset
levels which is open to empirical evaluation.
In fact, assuming that households as producers maximize benefits subject
to the usual technological restrictions (i.e. production function) and as consumers
maximize their welfare by optimizing consumption and work decisions given the
level of utility obtained, it is possible to establish a direct connection between
possession and access to assets and household spending levels.
Following Sadoulet and de Janvry (1995) and Singh et al. (1986), we assume
that the household behaves as if production and consumption/work decisions are
made sequentially and therefore we can solve the optimization problem recursively
in two steps. In the first step the production problem is solved and in the second
step the consumption problem is solved. Therefore the problem of optimization of








Group of variables 1 1+2 1+2+3 1+2+3+4 1 1+2 1+2+3 1+2+3+4
(1) Geography -0.239* -0.162 ** -0.283 ** -0.163 -0.152* -0.084** -0.052 ** 0.031
(2) Location -0.181 0.024 0.05 -0.123 0.021 0.039
(3) Geo * location 0.093 * 0.137 * 0.081 ** 0.008* 0.012 *** 0.007 **
(4) Infrastructure -0.118 * -0.024 ** -0.237 * -0.064 **
(6) Private assets -0.185 * -0.258 *
Explained -0.239 -0.250 -0.240 .0.241 -0.152 -0.199 -0.256 -0.244
Residual 0.022 0.033 0.023 0.003 -0.015 0.032 0.089 0.072
Total -0.217 -0.217 -0.217 -0.217 -0.167 -0.167 -0.167 -0.167148 CUADERNOS DE ECONOMÍA Vol. 42 (Mayo) 2005
where  a q  is the quantity produced at a price  a p , x are the variable factors used in
the production process and l is the amount of hours of work used with a price w.
g(0) represents the production function and the assets that affect the production
decision (e.g. fix capital, and size of the plot) are captured in q A .
The reduced form of the model is therefore,
Supply function q aaax qq(p,p,w;A) =
Factor demands: q ax xx(p,p,w;A) =
q ax ll(p,p,w;A) =
(3) Maximum profit: q ax **(p,p,w;A) pp =
In the second stage the consumption/work problem is solved, given the










where c the set of goods consumed by the household at prices  and s cl p,cl are
the time the household assigns to work in the house and hours of work out of the
household respectively with a total time constraint of E. Finally, Ah are assets that
affect the consumption decision.
The reduced form of the sequential model can then be expressed in terms of
the demand function for goods:
(5) amh cc(p,p,w,y*;A) =
where  aax y*pqpxwlwE =--+ .  From this demand functions we can then
obtain an expenditure function for the household:
(6) c GcpG(p;A), == g
where p is the price vectors and A is the vector of possession of assets that include
all the assets the household can access. Even more, these assets can be subdivided
according to the degree of transferability into private assets ( priv A ), public assets
( pub A ) and organizational assets ( org A ).
Therefore our equation of expenditures can be expressed as:
(7) privpuborg GG(p;A,A,A) =MEASURING THE IMPACT OF ASSET COMPLEMENTARITIES 149
We run a set of models including separately each of the following groups
of explanatory variables: neighboring public assets, private assets and individual
characteristics.  We then identify the direct externality effects from the presence of
each.5
We model at least three types of public goods and services: a) “traditional
infrastructure” such as transportation, sewer systems, water, electricity which
does not generate positive network externalities; b) “human-capital-generating
public services” that are capable of creating mobile private assets, such as
schooling and health services and c) “information and communication
technologies”, such as telephone or Internet, all of which generate network
externalities For example, an information highway is intrinsically different from a
transportation highway.
In order to test whether such non-linearities exist we will include in equation
(7) the quadratic terms of the stock of those assets in the specific districts of the
household. If the coefficient of the stock of this asset is negative and the coefficient
of its squared term positive, then we will have evidence in support of a “critical
mass” theory, in which the impact might be insignificant in low intensities of such
asset.
Assuming, for example, a quadratic function on the assets, the effect of an
increase in one of them on household expenditure can be expressed as:
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and the cross elasticity will be:
(10)
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5Escobal and Torero (2000) additionally test the hypothesis of the presence of spatial
concentration, they analyze the importance of neighboring effects by measuring the significance
of spatial autocorrelation in each of our specifications and test how it decreases as we include
additional groups of regressors. They model spatial dependence as a nuisance (a nuisance since
it only pertains to the errors).  Formally, this dependence is expressed by means of a spatial
process for the error terms, either of an autoregressive or a moving average form (see Anselin,
1980; Anselin, 1990, and Anselin, et al., 1996).150 CUADERNOS DE ECONOMÍA Vol. 42 (Mayo) 2005
Therefore, we can estimate the own and complementary elasticities –given
controls for all other public and private assets will be included- effects of the
different types of assets. The analysis of these elasticities as well as some
simulations that are carried on should shed light into the complementary nature of
public investments and their pattern across the income (expenditure) distribution
should make evident the presence of important non-linearities in public investments.
4.2. Some Preliminary Empirical Results
Tables 5 and 6 show the results of our reduced form depicted in equation
(7).  In Table 5 the model is included without interaction terms, while in table 6 the
full model including interaction between assets is presented. In both case two
estimations are shown. The first column shows the econometric estimation without
incorporating the sampling framework (sampling weights, stratification and
clustering), while the second column includes the full sampling frame.6 All of
these estimations are done using the rural households surveyed the Peruvian
LSMS of 2000.7   As mentioned by Deaton (1997), if the cluster design of the data
is ignored, standard formulas for variances of are erroneous generating upward
biased estimations, a result which applies essentially in the same way to the formu-
las for the variance-covariance matrices of regression parameters estimated by
OLS. Therefore to solve this problem we use the procedure developed by STATA
for correcting the estimated standard errors.
Our results, once we correct for the sampling framework, show that access
to human capital assets are critical when explaining the level of per capita
expenditure. Education for example shows a significant and positive effect both
for the household head and for other adults that are part of the household.8   Similarly,
6With respect to the use of sampling weights there is a important controversy both at the
theoretical and practical level. The discussion basically consists in two issues: (i) include or not
the sampling weights and the sample design in the estimation of the coefficients ii) to correct
or not to correct the standard errors associated to those coefficients (Deaton, 1997;
Pfeffermann,1993). A weighted regression provides a consistent estimate of the population
regression function, provided of course the assumption about functional form is correct. This
is especially relevant in our case in which we are looking at the mean of one variable conditional
on others.
7In surveys of rural areas such as the LSMS, clusters are often villages, so the households in a
single cluster live near one another, and are interviewed at much the same time during the
period that the survey team is in the village. As a result, the observations from the same cluster
are much more like one another than are observations from different clusters. At the simplest
they may be neighborhood effects, so that local eccentriticities are copied by those who live
near one another and become more or less uniform within a village (Deaton, 1997).
8Even more, when including the square term the sign is also positive and significant for both the
household head and the other adult household members which may imply that the return to
education increases as the number of years of education increase. However we excluded the
square terms from the regression because there were highly collinear with the interactions.MEASURING THE IMPACT OF ASSET COMPLEMENTARITIES 151
the effect of the migratory experience of the household is positive and significant.
Both of these variables are important in rural areas because they can be understood
as mobile assets. The analysis also confirms that access to credit and ownership
of assets that can be used as collateral has a positive effect on spending and
therefore on the probability of not being poor.
In addition, reductions in family size have a significant positive impact on
the return on the above-mentioned assets. The concept that an increase in family
size implies an increase in the productive resources of the family and therefore an
increase in family well-being is not empirically sustained. This could justify public
intervention in the area of family planning, but since the variable is endogenous to
other decisions and restrictions that affect the household, it is not possible to
validate such a policy recommendation without first understanding the mechanism
of the determination of family size. As specified in these calculations the variable
could in fact be capturing the effect of human capital-related variables that are not
easily observable.
When analysing the traditional infrastructure, as expected we find a
significant and positive impact over expenditure per capita of access to electricity
and access to infrastructure for drinkable water.9  In the specific case of time to
paved roads and access to primary or secondary schools both of these variables
become significant and with the expected signs when taking in to account their
complementarities with other assets. Specifically in the case of roads and as
mentioned previously an improvement in the transport system could significantly
reduce what is a significant constraint on agricultural efforts in the rural areas.  The
lack of a reliable transportation, reflected in high transport and transaction costs,
hampers the capacity of rural households to articulate with markets and forces
them to continue in subsistence agriculture.  Proximity to markets reduces effective
prices of agriculture inputs and outputs.  Purchases of modern inputs and sales of
outputs decline with distance from market, and transport costs influence farm
profits through input use and crop marketing decisions.  Even more, we find that
there is a strong complementarity between a closer access to roads and telephones,
something consistent with the idea of a reduction of transaction costs and an
increase to proximity of markets.
Several studies mentioned that telecommunications infrastructure
investment lead to economic growth in several ways. Basically, as the access to
telephone improves the costs of doing business fall, and output of households
should increase (Hardy, 1980; Saunders, et al., 1983).  Even more, and as previously
mentioned, telephones as an IT technology are intrinsically different from other
types of infrastructure: information highways are different from transportation
highways. The main characteristic which makes this technology different and
9In this specific case the variable which is positive and significant at 5% level of confidence is
the number of households with infrastructure for drinkable water. Additionally, these variables
could be measuring the need to have a critical mass of households connected to the drinkable
water system to be able to cover the significant fix cost needed to incur.152 CUADERNOS DE ECONOMÍA Vol. 42 (Mayo) 2005
10Is important to mention that fix telephones are not relevant in rural areas in Peru because of
the extreme adverse geography which makes extremely costly the installation of fix phones,
therefore access to public phones is the relevant IT variable for these areas.
which is not present in other types of infrastructure is network externalities: the
more users the more value is derived by those users. Given that these network
externalities are not present in the other types of infrastructure one may expect
that the returns of this asset will be higher. As expected our results show that
access to public telephones10 had a significant and positive effect but when
interacted with education and time to paved roads, showing not only its importance
by itself but also its complementarities with assets of the other two types previously
described.MEASURING THE IMPACT OF ASSET COMPLEMENTARITIES 153
TABLE 5
REGRESSION ANALYSIS OF THE PER CAPITA EXPENDITURE IN THE
HOUSEHOLD
Absolute value of t-statistic in parentheses.  The Cook Weisber test for heteroskedasticity was
carried and the null hypothesis of constant variance could not be rejected.
* significant at 5% level.  ** significant at 1% level.
(1) Simple regression analysis
(2) Regression analysis with sampling frame.
(1) (2)
Family size -0.1510 -0.1498
(23.956) ** (16.103) **
Age 0.0041 0.0038
(4.065) ** (3.238) **
Average education of the household head 0.0193 0.0153
(4.424) ** (3.131) **
Gender -0.0150 -0.0609
(0.334) (1.106)
Average education attained by family 0.0165 0.0146
(3.901) ** (3.237) **
Number of migrants 0.0408 0.0401
(3.211) ** (2.223) *






Access to public phones 0.1371 0.1519
(3.328) ** (1.771) *
Access to health services -0.0576 -0.0426
(1.759) (0.763)
Access to education services -0.0361 -0.0055
(1.014) (0.093)
Communal association -0.0442 -0.0863
(1.481) (1.751) *
Leadership in communal association 0.1365 0.1282
(2.951) ** (2.854) **
Value of durable goods 0.0000 0.0000
(5.174) ** (4.946) **
Value of agricultural equipment 0.0000 0.0000
(1.766) (2.834) **
Value of land 0.0000 0.0000
(1.000) (0.174)
Price of livestock 0.0000 0.0000
(2.109) * (1.747) *
Distance to roads -0.0094 -0.0085
(3.811) ** (2.061) *
Roofs made of tiles or rush mat with mud 0.0539 0.0759
(1.816) (1.887) *
Roofs made of hay or palm leaves -0.0868 -0.0938
(1.930) (1.795) *
Wooden floors 0.2372 0.2976
(4.412) ** (4.118) **
Parquet, vinyl or concrete floors 0.1923 0.2313
(5.524) ** (4.624) **
Percentage of homes with drinkable water in the community 0.0013 0.0018
(3.375) ** (3.378) **
Constant 7.4045 7.4382
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TABLE 6
REGRESSION ANALYSIS OF THE PER CAPITA EXPENDITURE IN THE
HOUSEHOLD USING V ARIABLES INTERACTIONS
(1) (2)
Family size -0.1499 -0.1490
(24.008) ** (16.560) **
Age 0.0038 0.0034
(3.749) ** 0.0000
Average education of the household head 0.0175 0.0130
(3.816) ** (2.582) **
Gender -0.0172 -0.0630
(0.389) (1.171)
Average education attained by family 0.0153 0.0138
(3.641) ** (3.004) **
Number of migrants 0.0425 0.0452
(3.372) ** (2.670) **






Access to public phones 0.0831 0.0272
(1.070) (0.284)
Access to health services -0.0504 -0.0373
(1.544) (0.715)
Access to education services -0.0874 -0.0629
(1.966) * (1.147)
Communal association 0.0164 -0.0157
(0.474) (0.263)
Leadership in communal association 0.1401 0.1300
(3.063) ** (2.993) **
Value of durable goods 0.0000 0.0000
(5.605) ** (5.155) **
Value of agricultural equipment 0.0000 0.0000
(0.183) (0.548)
Value of land 0.0000 0.0000
(1.774) (2.372) **
Price of livestock 0.0000 (2.960) **
(1.730) (1.525)
Distance to roads 0.0014 0.0082
(0.321) (1.359)
Roofs made of tiles or rush mat with mud 0.0840 0.1142
(2.506) * (2.713) **
Roofs made of hay or palm leaves -0.1000 -0.1018
(2.232) * (2.060) *
Wooden floors 0.2275 0.2734
(4.280) ** (3.934) **
Parquet, vinyl or concrete floors 0.1851 0.2159
(5.317) ** (4.549) **
Percentage of homes with drinkable water in the community 0.0011 0.0016
(2.837) ** (2.956) **
Squared value of land 0.0000 0.0000
(2.399) * (3.174) **
Sewerage and access to public phones 0.1775 0.2945
(1.860) (2.835) **
Electricity and communal association (1.860) (2.835) **
-0.2052 -0.1799
(3.384) ** (2.315) *MEASURING THE IMPACT OF ASSET COMPLEMENTARITIES 155
TABLE 6
(Continuation)
Absolute value of t-statistic in parentheses.  The Cook Weisber test for heteroskedasticity was
carried and the null hypothesis of constant variance could not be rejected.
* significant at 5% level.  ** significant at 1% level.
(1) Simple regression analysis
(2) Regression analysis with sampling frame.
Among the additional most important interactions that are shown to be
significant we should mention some obvious like the complementarity’s between
access to road infrastructure and the fact that the house has better roofs which
could be a result of a major market value of the house once there is a close by
paved road. At the same time several interaction point to complementarity’s nature
on public and private assets, for example between access to education
infrastructure and access to electricity.  Finally, statistical evidence was found that
variables of public and organizational capital such as being director of the local
organizations have a similar positive impact.
In the next section, using the parameters estimated from the spending
equations, we calculated the impact of changes in the ownership and access to
complementary assets on the level of expenditure.
4.3. Simulating the Impact of Access to different Types of Asset: Assessing
Complementarities
Using the expenditure function estimated in the previous section we have
run some simulations to show not only the importance of key assets in explaining
per-capita expenditure, but also the importance of complementarities in the allocation
of public infrastructure.
Table 7 shows how much will per capita expenditure increase if we provide
some additional infrastructure to rural dwellers. Here we evaluate the impact of
(1) (2)
Access to public phones and distance to roads -0.0155 -0.0245
(2.953) ** (3.937) **
Value of agricultural equipment x price of livestock 0.0000 0.0000
(1.783) (2.388) **
Average education of the household head x access to public phones 0.0072 0.0139
(0.802) (1.973) *
Access to education services x electricity 0.1486 0.1347
(2.155) * (1.676) *
Distance to roads x roofs made of tiles or rush mat with mud -0.0198 -0.0231
(1.901) (1.800) *
Constant 7.4454 7.4828
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public phones, education, sewerage systems and road infrastructure in each of the
5 quintiles of the rural expenditure distribution. For example Access to public
phones will increase per-capita expenditure by less than 2% in the poorest quintile
of the distribution and will increase it by 12% for the richest quintile of the
distribution. A similar pattern can be observed with respect to access to other key
assets that we evaluate here.
TABLE 7
V ARIATION IN HOUSEHOLD EXPENDITURE THROUGH ACCESS TO
SELECTED ASSETS
(By quintiles - percentage)
Table 8 shows the results of these simulations contrasting the effects of
provision of public infrastructure between poor and non-poor rural dwellers. As
expected although all rural inhabitants benefit with the provision of additional
public infrastructure, non-poor rural dweller tend to benefit more.  This is obviously
the effect of the additional private (and public) asset endowment that non-poor
have in comparison with the rural poor. A better educated rural dweller typically
positioned in the richest quintile may use the same public infrastructure in more
profitable way than a less educated rural dweller positioned in the poorest quintile.
TABLE 8




Access to public phones 8.26 3.87
Access to primary and secondary schools 6.24 3.75
Access to sewerage 6.04 3.43
Access to main road (reduction in 1 hour) 1.37 1.06
Access to main road (reduction in 2 hours) 2.76 2.14
1 2 3 4 5
Access to public phones 1.72 3.75 5.45 6.10 12.04
Access to primary and secondary schools 3.27 3.45 4.47 5.87 6.97
Access to sewerage 3.41 3.53 4.11 4.07 7.57
Access to main road (reduction in 1 hour) 0.95 1.04 1.30 1.17 1.52
Access to main road (reduction in 2 Hours) 1.90 2.09 2.61 2.36 3.06MEASURING THE IMPACT OF ASSET COMPLEMENTARITIES 157
TABLE 9
V ARIATION IN HOUSEHOLD EXPENDITURE THROUGH SIMULTANEOUS
ACCESS TO SELECTED ASSETS
(By quintiles - percentage)
Table 9 and 10 shows the combined effect of delivering different
combinations of public infrastructure to the rural inhabitants in Peru. Two very
interesting conclusions emerge from analyzing these simulations. First the results
show a positive effect of being able to access to more than one asset at the same
time. The combination of one or more assets sometimes increase the impact over
the welfare of the households in more than the sum of its individual impacts, and
in some cases the effect is multiplicative. Second, complementarity investments
tend to close the gap between poor and non poor rural dwellers. For example while
investing in public phones increases per capita expenditures in the richest and
poorest quintile in 12% and less than 2%, respectively, adding an additional
investment, like improved roads increases per capita expenditures in the richest
and poorest quintile in 18% and about 7%, respectively. Adding a third asset, like
sewerage, increases per capita expenditures in the richest and poorest quintile in
52% and 42%, respectively. The driving force behind these results is that those
lacking these additional assets are increasing in the poorest segments so their
marginal rate of return is higher. This is consistent with the idea that the
simultaneous provision of public assets is an effective way of equalizing
opportunities between the poor and non poor.
Access to public phones 1
Access to primary and secondary schools 2
Access to sewerage 3
Access to main road (reduction in 1 hour) 4
Access to main road (reduction in 2 hours) 5
1 2 3 4 5
1+2 5.06 7.34 10.17 12.33 19.85
1+3 33.44 36.05 37.70 39.18 42.49
1+4 4.25 6.33 8.07 8.74 14.82
1+5 6.84 8.97 10.75 11.43 17.67
2+3 6.79 7.10 8.77 10.18 15.06
2+4 4.25 4.53 5.83 7.11 8.59
2+5 5.24 5.62 7.20 8.37 10.24
3+4 0.95 1.04 1.30 1.17 1.52
3+5 1.90 2.09 2.61 2.36 3.06
1+2+3 37.81 40.75 43.86 47.35 52.42
1+2+4 8.38 10.83 13.99 16.08 23.93
1+2+5 11.81 14.43 17.93 19.96 28.16
1+3+4 37.66 40.47 42.47 43.82 47.35
1+3+5 42.02 45.04 47.40 48.63 52.38
2+3+4 7.80 8.22 10.17 11.47 16.81
2+3+5 8.82 9.34 11.60 12.77 18.59
1+2+3+4 41.17 45.32 48.84 52.27 57.62
1+2+3+5 46.67 50.05 53.99 57.35 62.99158 CUADERNOS DE ECONOMÍA Vol. 42 (Mayo) 2005
TABLE 10
V ARIATION IN HOUSEHOLD EXPENDITURE THROUGH
ACCESS TO SELECTED ASSETS
(Percentage)
6. CONCLUSIONS
This study has attempted to better understand the connection between
assets and poverty. We also evaluate the fact that geographic externalities arising
from natural geographic characteristics, like the adverse ones present in Peru,
could be the main reason explaining why poor households cannot escape out of
poverty. Our results show that what seem to be sizable geographic differences in
living standards in Peru can be almost fully explained when one takes into account
the spatial concentration of households with readily observable non-geographic
characteristics, in particular public and private assets.
Our analysis concentrates in studying the impact on poverty of having
access to public and private assets. We study three types of public goods and
services: traditional infrastructure, human-capital-generating public services and
information and communication technologies with their additional characteristic
Access to public phones 1
Access to primary and secondary schools 2
Access to sewerage 3
Access to main road (reduction in 1 hour) 4
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of network externality. The study shows the differential impact on poverty of each
of these types of investments, as well as the interaction effect between so- called
traditional types of infrastructure and those, which generate network externalities.
Within the human capital generating public services education (both
attainment and access to primary and secondary schools in the village), family
size, and social capital are of significant importance in explaining the state of
poverty of individuals. The analysis also confirms that ownership of assets that
can be used as collateral has a positive effect on spending and on the probability
of not being poor
On the other hand, statistical evidence was found that access to traditional
infrastructure such as water; sewerage, electricity and paved roads have a similar
impact as the human capital generating public services. In this respect, the empirical
analysis is consistent with the view that the behind the unequal access to assets
underlies the problem of high poverty rates and unequal income distribution that
Peru faces. Finally, access to telephones, the main information and communication
technology available in rural Peru also had a significant positive effect on the
welfare of rural households.
When looking to asset complementarities the results show a positive effect
on per-capita expenditure and poverty of being able to access to more than one
asset at the same time. In this sense access or ownership of a combination of two
or more assets tends to have a higher welfare impact than the sum of the individual
impacts. For example, if a poor household has access solely to telephone its
expenditure will increase in 4%. If it has improved access to a road (reduction in
one hour of travel time to the market) its expenditure increases in 1% However, if
access to both assets is granted its expenditure increases in 7%. Even more, if in
addition this household has access to primary and secondary schools in its village
then its expenditure will increase in more than 11%, while the arithmetic sum of the
increase in expenditure of having each asset alone will be only 7%. This result
clearly shows the role of public policy in terms of provision of services and
infrastructure as a mechanism to strengthen the return from private assets and
thus facilitates reduction of poverty. The results also show that the additional
provision of public goods serves as a equalizing force between the rural poor and
the non poor.160 CUADERNOS DE ECONOMÍA Vol. 42 (Mayo) 2005
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DATA SOURCES
At household level
• Living Standard Measurement Surveys 1985-86 and 1994, Cuanto Institute.
At province-level
• Population and Household Censuses 1972, 1981 and 1994, Instituto Nacio-
nal de Estadística e Informática: population and household characteristics.
• Third National Agrarian Census 1994, Instituto Nacional de Estadística e
Informática: agricultural variables, cattle and land.
• Basic Needs Map 1994. Instituto Nacional de Estadística e Informática:
basic needs and health variables
• Social Investment Map 1994, FONCODES: poverty index and its components,
living standard.
Geographic variables
• Arc data Online in: http://www.esri.com/data/online/esri/wothphysic.html.
This information was afterwards overlaid on a map of Peru at provincial and
district levels. The score for each province or district was selected according
to the position of its centroid on the thematic map: earthquake zones,
precipitation, soils and vegetation.
• Natural Resources in Peru 1995, Instituto Nacional de Recursos Naturales:
bioclimate and land potential scores.





Personal and family characteristics of the household head
Gender (1 if male, 0 if female)
Age years
Marital status (1=married, 0 single)
Family size number of members
Number of migrants number of members
Human capital assets
Average education attained by family Years of education
Average education of the household head Years of education
Mean Rural Peru Standard
median deviation
Personal and family characteristics of the household head
  Gender 0.90 1.00 0.31
  Age 45.32 42.00 15.22
  Marital status 0.51 1.00 0.50
  Family size 5.12 5.00 2.12
  Number of migrants 0.76 0.00 1.05
Human capital assets
  Average education attained by family 5.97 6.00 3.44
  Average education of the household head 6.07 6.00 3.79
  Access to primary school 0.81 1.00 0.39
  Access to secondary school 0.24 0.00 0.43
  Access to health services 0.29 0.00 0.45
  Communal association 0.70 1.00 0.46
  Leadership in communal associations 0.09 0.00 0.28
Physical capital assets
  Brick and concrete walls 0.07 0.00 0.26
  Wooden walls 0.17 0.00 0.38
  Roofs made of tiles or rush mat with mud 0.34 0.00 0.48
  Roofs made of hay or palm leaves 0.14 0.00 0.34
  Wooden floors 0.09 0.00 0.28
  Parquet, vinyl or concrete floors 0.21 0.00 0.41
  Value of durable goods 4,279.48 3,841.63 3,576.86
  Value of agricultural equipment 292.55 101.97 811.63
  Value of land 3.715.37 2,244.15 4,409.16
  Price of livestock 1.967.62 492.39 4,168.02
Financial capital assets
  Possession of financial savings 0.04 0.00 0.20
Traditional infrastructure
  Drinkable water 0.35 0.00 0.48
  Sewerage 0.10 0.00 0.30
  Electricity 0.34 0.00 0.48
  Distance to roads 2.45 0.60 5.50
  Percentage of homes with electricity in the community 34.33 0.00 42.40
  Percentage of homes with drinkable water in the community 35.26 16.67 38.56
Information and communication technologies
  Percentage of homes with telephone in the community 14.82 0.00 32.30
  Access to public phones 0.15 0.00 0.36MEASURING THE IMPACT OF ASSET COMPLEMENTARITIES 163
Access to primary school (1= if primary school in village, 0 if no
primary school in village)
Access to secondary school (1= if secondary school in village, 0 if no
secondary school in village)
Access to health services (1= if health services in village, 0 if no health
service in village)
Communal association (1= if participate in communal association, 0
if not participate in communal association)
Leadership in communal associations (1= if leader of communal association, 0 if
not leader of communal association)
Physical capital assets
Brick and concrete walls (1= house has brick and concrete walls, 0= if
house not has brick and concrete walls)
Wooden walls (1= house has wooden walls, 0= if house not
has wooden walls)
Roofs made of tiles or rush mat with mud (1= Roofs made of tiles or rush mat with mud,
0 if roofs are not made of tiles or rich mat with
mud)
Roofs made of hay or palm leaves (1= Roofs made of hay or palm leaves, 0 if
roofs are not made of hay or palm leaves)
Wooden floors (1= Wooden floors, 0 = no wooden floors)
Parquet, vinyl or concrete floors (1=Parquet, vinyl or concrete floors, = no
parquet, vinyl or concrete floors)
Value of durable goods Constant soles at prices of Lima (capital of
Peru)
Value of agricultural equipment Constant soles at prices of Lima (capital of
Peru)
Value of land Constant soles at prices of Lima (capital of
Peru)
Price of livestock Constant soles at prices of Lima (capital of
Peru)
Financial capital assets
Possession of financial savings (1=if household have financial savings, 0 if
household does not have financial savings)
Traditional infrastructure
Drinkable water (1= if Drinkable water at the household, 0 if
no drinkable water at the household)
Sewerage (1= if sewerage connected to the household,
0 if no sewerage connected to the household)
Electricity (1= if access to electricity at the household,
0 if no access to electricity at the household)
Distance to roads kilometers
Percentage of homes with electricity in the community percentage
Percentage of homes with drinkable water in the community percentage
Information and communication technologies
Percentage of homes with telephone in the community percentage
Access to public phones (=1 if there is a public phone in the village,













































BASIC STATISTICS BY QUINTILE
II I I I I I V V
Mean Median St. Dv. Mean Median St. Dv. Mean Median St. Dv. Mean Median St. Dv. Mean Median St. Dv.
Personal and family characteristics of the household head
Gender 0.91 1.00 0.28 0.89 1.00 0.31 0.91 1.00 0.29 0.89 1.00 0.31 0.87 1.00 0.34
Age 44.00 42.00 12.65 42.80 40.00 14.39 44.76 42.00 15.54 45.73 44.00 15.74 49.35 47.00 16.76
Marital status 0.54 1.00 0.50 0.47 0.00 0.50 0.56 1.00 0.50 0.50 0.00 0.50 0.46 0.00 0.50
Family size 6.77 7.00 2.05 5.50 5.00 1.97 5.23 5.00 1.74 4.55 4.00 1.76 3.52 3.00 1.61
Number of migrants 0.76 0.00 1.21 0.78 0.00 1.05 0.71 0.00 0.99 0.84 0.00 1.06 0.68 0.00 0.94
Human capital assets
Average education attained by family 5.09 5.25 2.50 5.65 6.00 3.09 6.15 6.00 2.94 6.07 6.00 3.67 6.91 7.00 4.45
Average education of the household head 5.11 6.00 3.08 5.64 6.00 3.54 6.16 6.00 3.64 6.35 6.00 3.90 7.08 6.00 4.41
Access to primary school 0.85 1.00 0.36 0.83 1.00 0.38 0.79 1.00 0.41 0.81 1.00 0.39 0.78 1.00 0.42
Access to secondary school 0.25 0.00 0.43 0.22 0.00 0.41 0.23 0.00 0.42 0.30 0.00 0.46 0.21 0.00 0.40
Access to health services 0.29 0.00 0.45 0.26 0.00 0.44 0.28 0.00 0.45 0.36 0.00 0.48 0.27 0.00 0.45
C o m m u n a l  a s s o c i a t i o n 0 . 7 41 . 0 00 . 4 40 . 7 21 . 0 00 . 4 50 . 7 41 . 0 00 . 4 40 . 7 21 . 0 00 . 4 50 . 5 91 . 0 00 . 4 9
L e a d e r s h i p  i n  c o m m u n a l  a s s o c i a t i o n 0 . 0 60 . 0 00 . 2 40 . 0 70 . 0 00 . 2 50 . 0 90 . 0 00 . 2 90 . 1 10 . 0 00 . 3 20 . 1 00 . 0 00 . 3 0
Physical capital assets
Brick and concrete walls 0.03 0.00 0.16 0.06 0.00 0.23 0.07 0.00 0.25 0.10 0.00 0.30 0.11 0.00 0.31
Wooden walls 0.21 0.00 0.41 0.20 0.00 0.40 0.14 0.00 0.35 0.18 0.00 0.39 0.12 0.00 0.33
R o o f s  m a d e  o f  t i l e s  o r  r u s h  m a t  w i t h  m u d 0 . 2 80 . 0 00 . 4 50 . 3 00 . 0 00 . 4 60 . 4 00 . 0 00 . 4 90 . 3 30 . 0 00 . 4 70 . 4 10 . 0 00 . 4 9
Roofs made of hay or palm leaves 0.21 0.00 0.41 0.16 0.00 0.36 0.10 0.00 0.30 0.15 0.00 0.36 0.06 0.00 0.23
Wooden floors 0.11 0.00 0.31 0.09 0.00 0.29 0.06 0.00 0.24 0.12 0.00 0.33 0.05 0.00 0.21
P a r q u e t ,  v i n y l  o r  c o n c r e t e  f l o o r s 0 . 1 30 . 0 00 . 3 30 . 1 30 . 0 00 . 3 40 . 1 70 . 0 00 . 3 70 . 2 40 . 0 00 . 4 30 . 3 80 . 0 00 . 4 9
Value of durable goods 3,759.44 3,626.52 2,574.16 3,620.73 3,465.45 2,846.55 4,158.35 3,735.27 3,836.61 4,391.10 4,084.36 3,420.84 5,472.85 4,730.84 4,573.13
Value of agricultural equipment 153.25 90.77 185.50 197.17 84.56 564.95 276.92 110.15 565.34 420.32 118.38 1,287.89 415.60 132.24 955.91
Value of land 3,576.69 2,423.74 3,490.04 3,204.09 1,994.80 3,268.19 3,636.14 1,994.80 4,570.58 3,945.82 2,244.15 4,744.44 4.216.23 2,423.74 5,543.48
Price of livestock 1,747.67 614.98 2,389.64 1,612.81 333.13 2,916.48 1,940.01 678.79 2,919.98 2,435.44 622.38 6,522.92 2,102.77 299.22 4,633.75
Financial capital assets
P o s s e s s i o n  o f  f i n a n c i a l  s a v i n g s 0 . 0 20 . 0 00 . 1 30 . 0 20 . 0 00 . 1 40 . 0 30 . 0 00 . 1 60 . 0 60 . 0 00 . 2 40 . 0 80 . 0 00 . 2 7
Traditional infrastructure
D r i n k a b l e  w a t e r 0 . 2 00 . 0 00 . 4 00 . 3 30 . 0 00 . 4 70 . 3 70 . 0 00 . 4 80 . 4 00 . 0 00 . 4 90 ' . 4 60 . 0 00 . 5 0
Sewerage 0.08 0.00 0.27 0.08 0.00 0.27 0.11 0.00 0.31 0.07 0.00 0.25 0.18 0.00 0.38
Electricity 0.24 0.00 0.43 0.24 0.00 0.43 0.32 0.00 0.47 0.40 0.00 0.49 0.51 1.00 0.50
Distance to roads 3.29 1.00 6.94 2.75 1-00 5.90 2.57 1.00 5.47 2.10 0.40 5.27 1.54 0.30 3.02
Percentage of homes with electricity in the community 23.81 0.00 37.55 26.52 0.00 38.95 35.04 0.00 43.36 38-71 0.00 43.52 47.61 51.52 44.19
Percentage of home with drinkable water in the
community
24.22 8.33 32.34 31.98 16.67 36.81 36.45 16.67 38.02 36.60 16.67 39.45 47.12 50.00 42.22
Information and communication technologies
Percentage of homes with telephone in the community 12.44 0.00 30.36 11.35 0.00 29.53 13.79 0.00 31.76 15.97 0.00 33.46 20.57 0.00 35.48
Access to public phones 0.12 0.00 0.32 0.11 0.00 0.31 0.14 0.00 0.34 0.15 0.00 0.36 0.23 0.00 0.42
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